Corporate Risk Management and the Incentive Effects of Debt
说明经理股东向风险资产转移的激励（资产替代问题）如何与公司可观测风险水平相关，并论证对冲可观测风险能降低风险转移激励及债务代理成本，为公司层面对冲可分散风险提供了正面理由。
This paper demonstrates how the incentive of manager-equityholders to substitute toward riskier assets, commonly referred to as the "asset substitution problem," is related to the level of observable risk in the firm. When observable and unobservable risks are sufficiently positively correlated, increases (decreases) in observable risk generate the incentive for manager-equityholders to increase (decrease) unobservable risk. Thus, credible commitments to hedge observable risk can benefit the firm's manager-equityholders by reducing the incentive to shift risk and the associated agency cost of debt. This provides a positive rationale for hedging diversifiable risk at the firm level.