Sequential Banking
研究借款人可能从多个贷款人顺序借贷的环境，发现额外借贷对先前债务产生负外部性，导致均衡利率更高、借款人负债更多且违约概率上升，适用于消费、企业和国际债务市场。
The authors study environments in which agents may borrow sequentially from more than one leader. Although debt is prioritized, additional lending imposes an externality on prior debt because, with moral hazard, the probability of repayment of prior loans decreases. Equilibrium interest rates are higher than they would be if borrowers could commit to borrow from at most one bank. Even though the loan terms are less favorable than they would be under commitment, the indebtedness of borrowers is greater. Further, additional lending causes the probability of default to increase. The results apply to markets for consumer, corporate, and international debt. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.