Search Deterrence
研究了销售方通过提高消费者搜索替代品后回头的难度或成本来阻吓搜索的技巧，发现单方面阻吓有利可图但集体行为可能损害卖家，且导致产品与消费者匹配不佳并抬高价格。
We study sales techniques which discourage consumer search by making it harder or more expensive to return to buy after a search for alternatives. It is unilaterally profitable for a seller to deter search under mild conditions, but sellers can suffer when all do so. When a seller cannot commit to its policy, it exploits the inference that those consumers who try to buy later have no good alternative, and in many cases the outcome is as if the seller must make an exploding offer. Search deterrence results in sub-optimal matching of products to consumers and often raises the price consumers pay.