Short selling, agency, and corporate investment
研究了卖空活动如何通过经理人与股东之间的代理问题导致企业过度投资，发现卖空兴趣与后续投资正相关，且高管薪酬对股价的敏感性越强，这种效应越明显。
Abstract In this article, we examine corporate investment decisions in a model with short selling. We show that high short‐selling activities can cause firms to overinvest and that the agency problems between managers and shareholders drive this overinvestment. Empirically, we find that short interest is positively associated with subsequent corporate investment and that the effect of short‐selling activities on investment is stronger when the sensitivity of chief executive officer compensation to stock price performance is greater. The results are not explained by short‐sale constraints or firm overvaluation. Additionally, short‐selling‐induced corporate investments can partly explain the negative relation between both short interest and corporate investment with subsequent stock returns.