Optimal Apportionment
为联邦议会席位分配中的递减比例原则提供了理论基础，通过分析个体效用函数与社会福利函数的关系，证明在效用函数为凹函数时，古典功利主义会推荐与人口规模呈递减比例的决策规则。
This paper provides a theoretical foundation that supports the degressive proportionality principle in apportionment problems, such as the allocation of seats in a federal parliament. The utility assigned by an individual to a constitutional rule is a function of the frequency with which each collective decision matches the individual's own will. The core of the argument is that, if the function is concave, then classical utilitarianism at the social level recommends decision rules that exhibit degressive proportionality with respect to the population size.