Impact of Competition and Taxes on Responsibility Center Organization and Transfer Prices
研究企业如何利用分权结构和转移价格在产品市场获得战略优势，发现销售办事处税率上升可能通过提高转移价格来缓解竞争，从而增加企业整体利润。
We show that a firm can use its decentralized organizational structure and transfer price as commitment devices to obtain strategic advantage in the product market only when there are nonstrategic reasons to decentralize and to distort transfer prices away from marginal costs, such as the sales office's local knowledge about market conditions and the presence of tax rate differentials across the two tax jurisdictions. Surprisingly, an increase in the sales office's tax rates may help a firm increase overall profits. An increase in the sales office's tax rates causes the firm to increase its transfer price, which in turn dampens the sales office's competition and may more than offset the effect of increased tax rates on the firm's overall profits.