持续性合同

Continuing Contracts

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · 2019
被引 7
ABS 3

中文导读

研究了持续性合同(如雇佣关系)中公平原则如何影响重新谈判,发现公平谈判虽能降低成本,但可能阻碍适应外部选择并导致低效结果,而长期关系的隐性承诺可改善效率。

Abstract

Abstract Parties often regulate their relationships through “continuing” contracts that are not fixed term but roll over: employment is a leading example. Our premise is that parties apply fairness when they revise a continuing contract and that prior terms, together with market information, will be a reference point. A continuing contract can reduce (re)negotiation costs relative to a short-term or long-term contract. However, fair bargaining makes adjusting to outside options difficult and may cause inefficient outcomes. An implicit promise of a long-term relationship, as in employment, can improve matters..

合同理论劳动经济学法律经济学谈判理论