Cheap Talk
经济学家对私人信息通过市场、信号传递等机制共享的研究很多，但大多数信息共享是通过日常非正式交谈完成的。本文基于博弈论近期研究，说明人们何时会通过廉价交谈传递私人信息。
Economists often ask how private information is shared through markets, costly signaling, and other mechanisms. Yet most information sharing is done through ordinary, informal talk. Economists are inconsistent in their view of such ‘cheap talk’: sometimes it is supposed that communication generally leads to efficient equilibria; other times it is supposed that since ‘talk is cheap,’ it is never credible. The authors think both views are wrong. In this paper, they describe what some recent research in game theory teaches about when people will convey private information by cheap talk.