Corporate Control and the Choice of Investment Financing: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions
检验了公司控制权考虑如何影响投资融资方式选择，发现管理层持股比例越高的收购方越倾向于使用现金而非股票融资，且股票融资的负面市场反应主要出现在管理层持股低的公司。
We test the proposition that corporate control considerations motivate the means of investment financing—cash (and debt) or stock. Corporate insiders who value control will prefer financing investments by cash or debt rather than by issuing new stock which dilutes their holdings and increases the risk of losing control. Our empirical results support this hypothesis: in corporate acquisitions, the larger the managerial ownership fraction of the acquiring firm the more likely the use of cash financing. Also, the previously observed negative bidders' abnormal returns associated with stock financing are mainly in acquisitions made by firms with low managerial ownership.