Bayesian Persuasion
研究一个人如何通过设计信息信号来说服另一个人改变行动，给出了信号存在且对发送者有利的充要条件，并分析了偏好一致程度的影响，适用于律师、游说者和销售人员的说服场景。
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a symmetric information model where a sender chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who then takes a noncontractible action that affects the welfare of both players. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a signal that strictly benefits the sender. We characterize sender-optimal signals. We examine comparative statics with respect to the alignment of the sender's and the receiver's preferences. Finally, we apply our results to persuasion by litigators, lobbyists, and salespeople.