Collateral Runs
研究了大型经纪交易商面临的一种未被探索的流动性风险来源：抵押品提供方的撤出。通过设定不同的回购合约条款，交易商可为自身活动融资，但现金借款方因担心交易商违约而撤回抵押品，引发挤兑，损害交易商偿付能力。
Abstract This paper models an unexplored source of liquidity risk large broker-dealers face: a withdrawal of collateral providers. By setting different contracting terms on repurchase agreements with cash borrowers and lenders, dealers can source funds for their own activities. Cash borrowers internalize the risk of losing their collateral in case their dealer defaults, prompting them to withdraw it. This incentive creates strategic complementarities among collateral providers, reducing a dealer’s liquidity position and compromising their solvency. Collateral runs are triggered by a contraction in dealers’ assets making them markedly different than traditional wholesale funding runs. Mitigating these risks involves different policy recommendations.