Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to Disagree: Can Overconfidence Survive the Market Test?
构建一个知情投机双寡头模型，发现过度自信交易者可能比理性交易者获得更高预期利润和效用，甚至超过自身理性时的表现，因为过度自信在古诺竞争中充当承诺机制，导致纳什均衡成为囚徒困境，使过度自信长期存续。
In a duopoly model of informed speculation, we show that overconfidence may strictly dominate rationality since an overconfident trader may not only generate higher expected profit and utility than his rational opponent, but also higher than if he were also rational. This occurs because overconfidence acts like a commitment device in a standard Cournot duopoly. As a result, for some parameter values the Nash equilibrium of a two-fund game is a Prisoner's Dilemma in which both funds hire overconfident managers. Thus, overconfidence can persist and survive in the long run.