Competitive Framing
提出了一个简单框架，用于建模两家企业在消费者选择依赖“框架”时的市场竞争，并分析了该框架下纳什均衡的特征及其在多种应用中的竞争与框架互动。
I present a simple framework for modeling two-firm market competition when consumer choice is “frame-dependent,” and firms use costless “marketing messages” to influence the consumer’s frame. This framework embeds several recent models in the “behavioral industrial organization” literature. I identify a property that consumer choice may satisfy, which extends the concept of Weighted Regularity due to Piccione and Spiegler (2012), and provide a characterization of Nash equilibria under this property. I use this result to analyze the equilibrium interplay between competition and framing in a variety of applications.