Mandatory Notice
用两期信号模型分析企业告知工人未来生存状况的动机，发现强制通知法可能降低工人福利、提高企业利润，但在特定条件下可改善帕累托效率。
Firms' incentives to inform workers about their future viability are analyzed using a two-period signaling model. The author finds that, if wages can be set after firms learn their viability, they will perfectly signal firms' closure plans. Mandatory-notice laws, if they have any effect at all, reduce worker utility and raise profits because they obviate the need for "permanent" firms to signal via higher wages. If a noncontingent wage must be set before any private information arrives, pooling occurs in the absence of legislation and mandatory-notice laws can be Pareto improving. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.