Analysts' Conflicts of Interest and Biases in Earnings Forecasts
研究分析师为赢得投行业务而调整盈利预测，发现1990年代牛市加剧了利益冲突，导致盈利意外分布偏移，增长型股票更明显，但与投行无关的分析师和国际市场偏移较小。
Abstract Analysts' earnings forecasts are influenced by their desire to win investment banking clients. We hypothesize that the equity bull market of the 1990s, along with the boom in investment banking business, exacerbated analysts' conflicts of interest and their incentives to strategically adjust forecasts to avoid earnings disappointments. We document shifts in the distribution of earnings surprises and related changes in the market's response to surprises and forecast revisions. The evidence for shifts is stronger for growth stocks, where conflicts of interest are more pronounced. However, shifts are less notable for analysts without ties to investment banking and in international markets.