Enforcement Spillovers
利用电视许可费缴纳的微观数据，以降雪量作为工具变量，研究发现执法活动在邻近区域产生显著溢出效应：平均每三次查处促使一个额外家庭守法，且未直接受检家庭合规率也明显上升。
Abstract This paper identifies spillovers from law enforcement. Our approach makes use of microdata on compliance with TV license fees that allow us to distinguish between households that were subject to enforcement and those that were not. Using snowfall as an instrument for local inspections, we find a striking response of households to increased enforcement in their vicinity: on average, three detections make one additional household comply with the law. As compliance rises significantly among those who had no exposure to field inspections, our findings establish a sizable externality in enforcement.