Simple equilibria in general contests
研究了在一般两人竞赛中，技能和努力如何通过通用生产技术结合产生产出，并揭示了竞赛要素如何相互作用以决定努力激励，发现更多异质性可能增加均衡努力。
We show how symmetric equilibria emerge in general two-player contests in which skill and effort are combined to produce output according to a general production technology and players have skills drawn from different distributions. The model includes the Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen (1981) models as special cases. Our paper provides intuition regarding how the contest components interact to determine the incentive to exert effort and sheds new light on classic comparative statics results. In particular, we show that more heterogeneity can increase equilibrium effort.