Optimal Vaccine Subsidies for Epidemic Diseases
将疾病流行病学与理性经济人市场结合，分析短期遏制疫情的最优疫苗补贴，发现补贴峰值出现在传播速度中等、非人人接种的疾病，并用COVID-19数据验证了实际意义。
Abstract We analyze optimal vaccine subsidies in a model integrating disease epidemiology into a market with rational economic agents. The focus is on an intensive vaccine campaign to quell an epidemic in the short run. Across a range of market structures, positive vaccine externalities and optimal subsidies peak for diseases that spread quickly, but not so quickly that everyone is driven to be vaccinated. We assess the practical relevance of this peak—as well as the existence of increasing social returns to vaccination and optimality of universal vaccination—in calibrations to the COVID-19 pandemic.