The Targeting and Impact of Partisan Gerrymandering: Evidence from a Legislative Discontinuity
研究发现，当政党在州立法机关中席位占比超过50%时，其对选区划分的影响力会突然增加，从而在后续众议院选举中赢得席位的概率提高11个百分点。
Abstract A party’s influence over redistricting increases discontinuously when its seat share in the state legislature exceeds 50%. We apply bunching tests to show that, in the election before redistricting, parties systematically win narrow majorities in legislatures of states where they have lost recent U.S. House races. This trend of losses is reversed after redistricting despite no change in overall House vote shares in states near the cutoff. The pre-to-post-redistricting change in regression discontinuity estimates implies that the party that controls redistricting engineers an 11 percentage point increase in its probability of winning a House race.