Strategic capacity choice with risk-averse firms
研究了不确定性、竞争和风险厌恶对双寡头企业最优投资时机和规模的联合影响，发现风险厌恶会改变领导者策略、降低投资规模并延迟租金均等化点。
We study the joint effect of uncertainty, competition, and risk-aversion on the optimal time and size of firms in a duopoly. As risk-aversion increases, the leader’s alternatives between deterring and accommodating the follower’s entry become equivalent. When the leader’s role is assigned exogenously, risk-aversion reduces equilibrium investment sizes and timing. In equilibrium, the leader is always the largest firm in the market. When the leader’s role is determined in equilibrium, risk-aversion delays the rent equalization point. At high levels of risk-aversion, both firms invest in the same capacity.