Was Sarbanes–Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation
利用S&P 1500公司面板数据，通过委托代理模型量化萨班斯-奥克斯利法案对CEO薪酬的影响，发现该法案减少了股东与CEO的利益冲突，但增加了代理成本和行政成本。
ABSTRACT This paper investigates the effects of regulatory interventions on contracting relationships within firms by examining the impacts of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act on CEO compensation. Using panel data of the S&P 1500 firms, it quantifies welfare gains from a principal–agent model with hidden information and hidden actions. It finds that SOX: (1) reduced the conflict of interest between shareholders and their CEOs, mainly by reducing shareholder loss from CEOs deviating from their goal of expected value maximization; (2) increased the cost of agency, or the risk premium CEOs are paid to align their interests with those of shareholders; (3) increased administrative costs in the primary sector (which includes utilities and energy) but the effect in the other two broadly defined sectors, services and consumer goods, was more nuanced; and (4) had no effect on the attitude of CEOs toward risk.