Public governance and executive perks under a weak corporate governance environment
研究发现中国国家主导的反腐败运动能够缓解因企业内部治理薄弱而导致的高管过度在职消费，且这种效应在地方国企中更强，并溢出至非国企。
Abstract We reveal state‐led anti‐corruption campaigns in China can mitigate excess executive perk consumption facilitated by firms' weak internal control environment. Our findings suggest that public governance can substitute for firm‐level governance mechanisms. Since these campaigns enhance the central government's disciplinary power over local state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), the above effects are heightened among SOEs controlled by provincial/municipal governments rather than the central government. Irrespective of political connections, non‐SOEs are also affected, indicating policy effect spillover to China's private sectors. We explore several underlining mechanisms for these effects, including Communist Party Committee governance, chief executive officer/chairperson dismissal, industry competition, and firm productivity.