Credible Persuasion
提出了贝叶斯说服问题中可信性的新概念，证明可信披露政策等价于状态和行动上的循环单调性条件，并应用于柠檬市场，发现即使卖家能承诺披露政策，也无法可信地披露有用信息。
We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the credibility of a disclosure policy is equivalent to a cyclical monotonicity condition on its induced distribution over states and actions. We also characterize how credibility restricts the Sender's ability to persuade under different payoff structures. In particular, when the sender's payoff is state-independent, all disclosure policies are credible. We apply our results to the market for lemons, and show that no useful information can be credibly disclosed by the seller, even though a seller who can commit to her disclosure policy would perfectly reveal her private information to maximize profit.