The Commission's Approach to Rule of Law Backsliding: Managing Instead of Enforcing Democratic Values?
研究了欧盟委员会针对匈牙利和波兰违反民主与法治价值观所采取的措施，指出除法治条件机制外，其他工具存在原因与解决方案不匹配的问题，软措施无法应对故意违规。
Abstract In response to noncompliance with the EU's fundamental values such as democracy and the rule of law in Hungary and Poland, the EU Commission has established the Justice Scoreboard, the Rule of Law Framework and the Rule of Law Mechanism. Moreover, the Commission has proposed linking the disbursement of funds to respect for the rule of law (Rule of Law conditionality). However, the deployment of these measures has not restored compliance. Drawing on the two dominant approaches in compliance studies, the management approach and the enforcement approach, this paper argues that with the exception of Rule of Law conditionality, the Commission's tools are characterized by a mismatch between the causes of the problems identified and the solutions chosen. Instead of sanctioning voluntary noncompliance, they rely on soft measures, which are recommended in cases of involuntary noncompliance, but which are not suitable in cases of deliberate noncompliance.