Attraction versus Persuasion: Information Provision in Search Markets
研究了搜索摩擦市场中企业如何通过广告决定消费者访问时获取的信息量，发现均衡下企业面临吸引与说服的相反激励，信息提供取决于产品质量和竞争强度。
We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer’s visit will glean. In the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game, the countervailing incentives of attraction and persuasion yield a payoff function for each firm that is linear in the firm’s realized effective value. If the expected quality of the products is sufficiently high (or competition is sufficiently fierce), this corresponds to full information: firms provide the first-best level of information. If not, this corresponds to information dispersion: firms randomize over signals.