COMPETITION AND MULTILEVEL TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS ADOPTION IN U.S. HOSPITALS
构建并估计了一个动态寡头模型，研究美国医院对电子病历的多层次采纳，发现竞争效应促使医院抢先采纳，并评估了2009年政府补贴政策的有效性。
Abstract This article develops and estimates a dynamic oligopoly model to study the multilevel adoption of electronic medical records in U.S. hospitals. I find substantial competitive effects in the adoption process, and hospitals of the same adoption level compete more intensely than hospitals of different levels do. Counterfactual experiments suggest that competitive effects prompt hospitals to engage in preemptive adoption and greatly deter the second adopter in a duopoly market. By evaluating the government's subsidy policy enacted in 2009, I find that a policy strategy accounting for market and hospital heterogeneity and competitive effects would have been more effective in stimulating adoption.