Decomposing coordination failure in stag hunt games
结合新理论框架与两个实验，发现鹿猎博弈中的行为与多数模型预测不符，并揭示出博弈可分解为战略、行为与核心三个部分，其中行为成分常被忽略但影响显著。
Abstract Many situations involve trading-off what is safe for the individual and what is beneficial for the group. This tension is extensively studied as the “Stag Hunt” coordination game. By combining a new theoretical approach with two experiments, this paper shows a disconnection between behavior in Stag Hunt games and the predictions of many models. Any Stag Hunt game can be uniquely decomposed into three payoff components: strategic, behavioral, and kernel. The behavioral component exists in every Stag Hunt game despite being largely ignored by previous models. Arbitrarily many Stag Hunt games exist where these models predict the same behavior. Despite the constant predictions, behavior in repeated and one-shot games systematically vary. The mechanism underlying these results is that all models of Stag Hunt behavior fail to properly account for the influence of the behavioral component.