NETWORK EXTERNALITIES, DOMINANT VALUE MARGINS, AND EQUILIBRIUM UNIQUENESS
研究了存在价格歧视的易倾斜网络市场，发现采用单调性准则时，网络竞争可能具有关于赢家身份的唯一子博弈完美均衡，主导品牌由产品特征决定；提出了主导价值边际概念，衡量分而治之策略的有效性。
ABSTRACT We examine tippy network markets that accommodate price discrimination. The analysis shows that when a mild equilibrium refinement, the monotonicity criterion, is adopted, network competition may have a unique subgame‐perfect equilibrium regarding the winner's identity; the prevailing brand may be fully determined by its product features. We bring out the concept of the dominant value margin, which is a metric of the effectiveness of divide‐and‐conquer strategies. The supplier with the larger dominant value margin may always sell to all customers in equilibrium. Such a market outcome is not necessarily socially efficient.