GAMING A SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS SYSTEM
研究大学在同时使用高中背景和标准化考试成绩招生时，学生如何策略性博弈，并评估取消考试或扩大招生等政策对选拔效果的影响。
Abstract A university uses both early‐stage selection outcome (high‐school affiliation) and late‐stage admission test outcome (standardized test scores) to select students. We use this model to study policies that have been proposed to combat inefficient gaming in college admissions. Increasing university enrollment size can exacerbate gaming and worsen the selection outcome. Abolishing standardized tests for university admissions increases gaming targeting high‐school admissions and worsens the selection outcome, whereas eliminating high‐school ability sorting may improve the university selection outcome under some cost conditions of gaming. Committing to a lower‐powered selection scheme can improve the selection outcome by reducing gaming behaviors.