Bargaining with Mechanisms
研究两个玩家就一件不可分割商品和转移支付进行讨价还价，其中一方对另一方的偏好信息不完全。双方均可提出任意机制来决定分配，发现存在唯一的完美贝叶斯均衡结果，且最优菜单最多包含三种分配方案。
Two players bargain over a single indivisible good and a transfer, with one-sided incomplete information about preferences. Both players can offer arbitrary mechanisms to determine the allocation. We show that there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. In the equilibrium, one of the players proposes a menu that is optimal for the uninformed player among all menus, such that each type of the informed player receives at least her payoff under complete information. The optimal menu can be implemented with at most three allocations. Under a natural assumption on the uninformed player’s beliefs, the optimal menu coincides with the Myerson’s neutral solution to the bargaining problem in this environment.