Executive Board Chairs: Examining the Performance Consequences of a Corporate Governance Hybrid
研究了执行董事会主席这一兼顾监督与战略决策的混合角色对企业绩效的影响，发现其能解决独立监督与战略参与之间的权衡，尤其在需要加强对CEO监控时效果更强，但在组织复杂性高时效果减弱。
Traditional agency theory views the proper role of the board chair exclusively as providing independent oversight to monitor and control the CEO. Recently, firms have introduced innovations in board leadership that have confounded these theoretical expectations. One notable innovation is the executive board chair, a corporate governance hybrid responsible for both oversight and strategic decision-making, challenging agency theory's prescription that the two activities remain separate. In this study, we argue that an executive board chair position can resolve the trade-off between independent oversight and involvement in strategy and therefore generate a performance advantage. We also predict that, owing to the blurring of lines between the CEO and board chair roles that the executive board chair position creates, the relationship will be stronger the greater the need to monitor and control the CEO but weaker when organizational complexity and board leadership demands are greater. Analysis of S&P 1500 firms from 2003 to 2017 provides general support for our arguments.