On the Role of Risk Aversion and Market Design in Capacity Expansion Planning
通过扩展基于主体的电力市场模型，研究了投资者风险规避程度与市场设计（能量市场与容量机制）对容量投资、电价及资源充裕度的交互影响，发现风险规避在能量市场中影响更显著，且市场设计不协调可能产生跨境负面效应。
Investment decisions in competitive power markets are based upon thorough profitability assessments. Thereby, investors typically show a high degree of risk aversion, which is the main argument for capacity mechanisms being implemented around the world. In order to investigate the interdependencies between investors’ risk aversion and market design, we extend the agent-based electricity market model PowerACE to account for long-term uncertainties. This allows us to model capacity expansion planning from an agent perspective and with different risk preferences. The enhanced model is then applied in a multi-country case study of the European electricity market. Our results show that assuming risk-averse rather than risk-neutral investors leads to slightly reduced investments in dispatchable capacity, higher wholesale electricity prices, and reduced levels of resource adequacy. These effects are more pronounced in an energy-only market than under a capacity mechanism. Moreover, uncoordinated changes in market design may also lead to negative cross-border effects.