Efficient Matching in the School Choice Problem
提出“优先级中性”和“优先级高效”匹配概念，证明存在唯一优先级高效匹配，它优于所有稳定匹配，且在该机制中诚实是每个学生的最大最小最优策略。
Stable matchings in school choice needn’t be Pareto efficient and can leave thousands of students worse off than necessary. Call a matching μ priority-neutral if no matching can make any student whose priority is violated by μ better off without violating the priority of some student who is made worse off. Call a matching priority-efficient if it is priority-neutral and Pareto efficient. We show that there is a unique priority-efficient matching and that it dominates every priority-neutral matching and every stable matching. Moreover, truth-telling is a maxmin optimal strategy for every student in the mechanism that selects the priority-efficient matching.