Influence of governance bundles and directors' social capital on cash holding in foreign cross‐listed firms
研究了治理组合和董事社会资本如何共同影响外国交叉上市公司的现金持有水平，发现董事社会资本较高时，治理组合与现金持有正相关，有助于理解企业现金持有意图并改进治理结构。
Abstract This paper provides new evidence on how both governance bundles and directors' social capital together can help to determine cash holdings for foreign cross‐listed firms. Using a large cross‐country sample of 1677 publicly listed firms from 32 countries during the period of 2004–2015, we find a positive relationship between governance bundles and cash holdings for foreign cross‐listed firms with higher directors' social capital. We address potential issue of endogeneity. Therefore, our findings are robust to alternative model specifications and instrumentations and alternative measure of social capital. The findings of our study contribute to the inconclusive decision in the academic literature related to cash holdings, governance bundles, and directors' social capital, especially related to the foreign cross‐listed firms. In addition, the findings can assist the stakeholders of foreign cross‐listed firms to understand the intention of the firms' cash holdings and allow policy makers to identify the need of modification for governance structure by controlling the opportunistic behaviour of the firm manager.