Housing tax expenditures and financial intermediation
通过多主体动态一般均衡模型，研究了住房税收优惠变化对宏观经济总量和福利的影响，发现银行金融摩擦会降低税收乘数，而取消抵押贷款利息扣除是产出损失最小的住房税改政策。
Abstract Through the lens of a multi‐agent dynamic general equilibrium model, we examine the effects of changes in preferential housing‐related tax treatments on macroeconomic aggregates and welfare. Our first finding is that financial frictions on banks contribute to lowering tax multipliers. The multipliers that we find are smaller over a horizon of 20 quarters—they range from to , while the long‐run tax multipliers range from to . We then find that the reduction in the deduction of mortgage interest payments delivers the lowest long‐run multiplier. We also implement revenue‐neutral tax reforms and find that the repeal of mortgage deductibility is the best housing tax policy because it generates small losses in output.