Global carbon price asymmetry
研究社会规划者如何选择各国碳价格以最大化全球福利，发现由于市场势力扭曲，最优碳价格可能高度不对称：一些国家为零，另一些国家高于社会碳成本。
This paper studies a social planner who chooses countries’ carbon prices so as to maximize global welfare. Product markets are characterized by firm heterogeneity, market power, and international trade. Because of the market-power distortion, the planner’s optimal policy is second-best. The main insight is that optimal carbon prices may be highly asymmetric: zero in some countries and above the social cost of carbon in countries with relatively dirty production. This result obtains even though a uniform global carbon price is always successful at reducing countries’ emissions. Competition policy that mitigates market power may enable stronger climate action.