The Corroboration Role of Management Earnings Forecasts in Private Loan Markets
研究发现，在贷款前6个月发布管理层盈利预测的企业能获得更低的贷款利差，且预测越频繁、越精确，利差越低，表明公开盈利预测能证实银行私下获取的信息，降低信息风险。
Management earnings forecasts (MEFs) may reduce information risk by corroborating the inferences that lenders draw from their private communication with borrowers. Consistent with this idea, we find that among firms with a general policy of issuing MEFs, those providing MEFs in the 6 months before loan origination with a forecast horizon beyond the origination date enjoy lower loan spreads. The frequency and precision of MEFs are also negatively associated with loan spreads. The associations are stronger when lenders’ need for corroboration of their private information is expected to be greater. The associations are not driven by a firm’s general information environment, signaling of managerial ability, opportunistic disclosure, or competition between public and private debt markets. Moreover, the issuance, frequency, and precision of MEFs are associated with loan amounts more spread out among participating lenders, suggesting that MEFs also reduce information asymmetry within a loan syndicate. Our study provides insight into the corroboration role of publicly disseminated MEFs in private loan markets.