Customer Concentration and Managerial Bad News Withholding
研究发现客户集中度高的公司，经理人更倾向于隐瞒坏消息；依赖大客户的公司效应更强，而客户转换成本高或审计监督强时效应减弱。
We investigate whether the presence of major corporate customers affects managerial bad news withholding behaviors. Using data from a large sample of U.S. firms, we find that firms with a more concentrated customer base have a greater tendency to withhold bad news. Furthermore, we show an amplified effect of customer concentration on bad news withholding for firms that rely more on major customers and an attenuated effect for firms whose major customers would face higher costs to switch suppliers. We also show that the effect of customer concentration on bad news withholding is weaker for firms with stronger auditor monitoring. Overall, we find that a concentrated customer base imposes performance pressure on managers, which induces them to withhold bad news.