The Effects of Capital Requirements on Good and Bad Risk-Taking
研究资本要求监管的动态定量模型，发现非金融企业持有存款的新一般均衡渠道降低了提高资本要求的成本，最优资本要求比仅家庭持有存款的模型高7.3个百分点。
Abstract We study capital requirement regulation in a dynamic quantitative model in which nonfinancial firms, as well as households, hold deposits. A novel general equilibrium channel that operates through firms deposits mitigates the cost of increasing capital requirements. In the calibrated model, (a) the optimal capital requirement is 7.3 percentage points higher than in a comparable model in which all the deposits are held by households, and (b) setting the capital requirement higher than the true optimum is not as costly as one would gauge from the comparable model. We also provide some independent evidence that supports our novel channel.