Harmonic price targeting
研究了差异化产品价格竞争模型中，企业基于消费者价格敏感度估计进行三级价格歧视，发现完全覆盖且信息对称时信息仅再分配福利，不完全覆盖时信息总有利于企业但福利效果模糊，信息不对称时企业获益减少且总福利取决于不对称程度。
This paper studies third-degree price discrimination in a classical model of price competition with differentiated products. Firms charge different prices to different consumers, based on their estimate of their price sensitivity. If the market is fully covered and information is symmetric, more accurate information has a pure redistributive effect, leading to higher profits but lower consumer welfare. If the market is not covered, information always benefit firms but the welfare effects are ambiguous. If information is asymmetric, firms benefit from more information, but less so than in the symmetric case, and total welfare depends on the extent of this asymmetry. I conclude that firms have strong incentives to share information about consumer tastes.