The consequences of earnings management for the acquisition premium in friendly takeovers
研究了欧洲578家公司在2005-2015年间被友好收购前一年的盈余管理行为，发现向下盈余管理会导致收购方支付更高溢价，这可能是双方协商的会计策略。
Abstract This study investigates the effect of earnings management (EM) on deal premiums in friendly takeovers. It examines both accruals and real EM in the year preceding the deal announcement, based on a sample of 578 European firms subject to an acquisition or acquisition attempt between 2005 and 2015. The empirical findings suggest that downward EM is associated with a higher premium offered by the acquirer. The results suggest that income‐decreasing accounting choices could be a negotiated strategy between the acquirer and target firms’ managers to clean the balance sheet, reduce the likelihood of litigation, and create a fictive performance through an accrual reversal post‐acquisition.