Strategic Behavior and Market Design in Regional Climate Policy
研究了美国区域气候政策与电力市场设计不匹配导致的碳泄漏问题，构建理论模型分析不同市场设计下气候政策的效果，对政策制定者和电力市场研究者有参考价值。
U.S. electricity markets vary by region and imperfectly overlap with regional climate policies. Although emissions leakage across emissions-regulated and -unregulated areas may depend on regional market design, and the extent of trading between market designs, previous studies of leakage from regional climate policies have focused on market power and market efficiency within only a centralized region following market rules. I develop a theoretical model which considers a second-best problem where a climate policy to correct for a negative externality from carbon emissions can be distorted by another market failure from the market design itself. My model allows for several types of non-overlapping climate policies and electricity market designs, and generates leakage predictions for these combinations.