Present bias in the labor market – when it pays to be naive
研究当企业无法承诺长期合同时，对现时偏向员工的最优雇佣契约。发现天真的员工比理性或老练的员工处境更好，而企业可能从对员工天真程度的无知中获益。
We study optimal employment contracts for present-biased employees if firms cannot commit to long-term contracts. Assuming that an employee's effort increases his chances to obtain a future benefit, we show that individuals who are naive about their present bias will actually be better off than sophisticated or time-consistent individuals. Moreover, firms might benefit from being ignorant about the extent of an employee's naiveté. Our results also indicate that naive employees might be harmed by policies such as employment protection or a minimum wage, whereas sophisticated employees are better off.