Asymmetric Information in a Capital Accumulation Differential Game with Spillover and Learning Effects
研究了在投资成本因自身学习效应和竞争对手溢出效应而降低的资本积累博弈中，六种信息结构如何影响企业投资决策和长期收益，发现只有当双方都考虑信息时信息才有价值。
Abstract This paper considers a capital accumulation game where the installation costs of investments are lowered by the firm’s own capital stock because of learning and by the competitor’s capital stock because of spillover effects. To properly understand the impact of the two capital stocks, we consider six information structures which differ in whether a firm takes into account that their competitor’s strategy depends only on time or on one or both capital stocks. We find that if firms are aware that their own capital stock makes investments of the competitor more efficient, a firm would invest less. Due to this effect, information only pays off if it is taken into account by both competitors, because otherwise the less informed and therefore less cautious player invests more and has a higher capital stock and revenues in the long run.