Under Suspicion: Trust Dynamics with Secret Undermining
研究组织如何动态筛选忠诚度不确定的代理人，代理人可能反复实施破坏行为且仅被随机发现。最优承诺策略呈现离散与渐进特征，包含“不信任”和“信任”阶段，且无需承诺时仍为均衡结果。
Abstract We study how an organization should dynamically screen an agent of uncertain loyalty whom it suspects of committing damaging acts of undermining. The organization controls the stakes of the relationship, while the agent strategically times undermining, which can occur repeatedly and is detected only stochastically. The optimal commitment stakes policy exhibits both discreteness and gradualism, with distinct “untrusted” and “trusted” phases featuring gradually rising stakes during the untrusted phase and a discrete gap in stakes between phases. This policy is also the equilibrium outcome when the organization cannot commit, and the agent’s equilibrium undermining policy exhibits variable, non-monotonic intensity.