Social hierarchy effect of political strategy: Exploring chairman's political position influence on independent directors' dissent
研究发现董事长拥有政治职位会降低独立董事对董事会提案提出异议的可能性，这种影响在独立董事地位较高或国有企业中较弱，在受监管行业或受儒家文化影响强的企业中更强。
Abstract Research question/issue Although the dark side of corporate political connections has been highlighted in recent studies, their adverse consequences on board decision making have received limited research attention. In this study, we posit that the political position of a chairman leads to greater power and a higher ranking on the board, which adversely influences the dissenting behavior of independent directors. Research findings/insights In line with our predictions, we show that the presence of a chairman with political position will reduce the likelihood that independent directors will dissent on board proposals. Such influence is particularly weaker in firms that have higher status independent directors on boards and are state owned but stronger among firms in regulated industries and those strongly influenced by Confucian beliefs. These predictions are supported using a sample of Chinese firms from 2004 to 2016. Theoretical/academic implications Our findings contribute to the board dynamics and decision‐making literature by highlighting how the political position of a board chairman can adversely affect the decision‐making quality of the whole board by reducing the propensity for independent directors to dissent. Practitioner/policy implications The findings of this work also provide important insights to policymakers who are keen to improve corporate governance mechanisms by designing political strategies for firms.