The wealth effects of takeover bids regulation in the European Union
研究了欧盟《收购要约指令》对并购交易的影响，发现该法规在股东保护较好的国家促进了价值提升型收购，并提高了企业成为收购目标的可能性与市场价值。
Abstract We investigate the wealth effects of the Takeover Bids Directive, enacted by the European Union (EU), on mergers and acquisitions. The directive aims at protecting target minority shareholders by restricting antitakeovers provisions and preventing managerial entrenchment. We test the regulation impact using a treatment sample of EU public acquisitions and a control sample from outside the EU. Our results suggest diverse effects of the regulation across treatment countries: acquirers from countries with better shareholder protection engage in more value‐enhancing acquisitions postregulation that could otherwise be too costly. The regulation also increases the likelihood of firms becoming targets and raises market value.