Incentivizing Demand for Supply-Constrained Care: Institutional Birth in India
研究了印度JSY项目（向女性支付费用以在医疗机构分娩）对围产期死亡率的影响，发现该项目在医疗系统能力低的地区增加了死亡率，尤其对复杂分娩危害更大，并降低了产后护理质量，产生负面溢出效应。
Abstract If overcrowding harms health care quality, the impacts of encouraging more people to use services are not obvious. Impacts will depend on whether marginal entrants benefit and whether they benefit enough to offset the congestion externalities imposed on inframarginal users. We develop a general-equilibrium model that formalizes these ideas. We examine them empirically by studying JSY, a program in India that paid women to give birth in medical facilities. We find evidence that JSY increased perinatal mortality in areas with low health-system capacity, was particularly harmful in more-complex births, reduced the quality of facilities' postnatal care, and generated harmful spillovers onto other services.