International trade and environmental corporate social responsibility
研究了在不完全竞争的国际市场中，企业采取环境企业社会责任的动机，发现环境税和政府合作能促进企业环保行为，而跨境污染则抑制该动机。
This paper analyzes firms' incentives to engage in environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) in an international market under imperfect competition. We find that in the absence of environmental taxes firms do not adopt ECSR. However, the implementation of environmental taxes by governments encourages firms to adopt ECSR under local damage. Consumers, producers, and environmentalists are better off if firms decide to be environmentally responsible than if they decide not to. We also find that the decision to adopt ECSR depends on transboundary pollution. Under global damage firms engage in ECSR only if they are highly concerned about the environment. This means that the existence of transboundary pollution negatively affects the incentives of firms to be environmentally friendly. Finally, we find that when governments cooperatively determine their environmental taxes, firms engage in ECSR under both local and global damage. Thus, under global damage firms have greater incentives to be environmentally friendly when governments cooperate on environmental policies than when they do not.