Monetary Policy and Sovereign Debt Sustainability
在一个小型开放经济模型中，政府发行长期名义债务且不能承诺不违约或通过通胀侵蚀其实际价值，分析了货币政策对主权债务可持续性和福利的影响。通胀是一种部分违约形式，比直接违约更具状态依赖性，能扩大偿还区域并在债务压力下带来福利收益，但长期收益有限。
Abstract We analyze the consequences of monetary policy for sovereign debt sustainability and welfare in a model of a small open economy where the government issues long-term nominal debt without a commitment not to default on it or erode its real value through (costly) inflation. Inflation is a form of partial default, one that is more state-contingent than outright default. This reduces the government’s incentives to default outright and hence enlarges the repayment region, compared to a regime in which debt cannot be inflated away. Moreover, inflation delivers sizable welfare gains in situations of sovereign debt stress, in which its benefits as a debt-stabilizing tool are larger. Over the longer run, however, the welfare gains from inflation are more modest, because the inflationary bias leads the government to create inflation also in situations in which it is less useful for debt-stabilization purposes.